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Abstract: We defend a version of left-libertarianism, and discuss some of its 
implications for global justice (and economic justice among nations in particular).  
Like the better known right-libertarianism, left-libertarianism holds that agents 
own themselves.  Unlike right-libertarianism, left-libertarianism holds that natural 
resources (land, oil, air, etc.) are owned in some egalitarian sense and can be 
legitimately appropriated by individuals or groups only when the appropriations 
are compatible with the specified form of egalitarian ownership.  We defend the 
thesis of self-ownership on the grounds that it is required to protect individuals 
adequately from interference in their lives by others.  We then defend a particular 
conception of egalitarian ownership of natural resources according to which those 
who appropriate unappropriated natural resources must pay competitive rent 
(determined by supply and demand) for the rights that they have claimed. 
 We then go on to apply the principles to issues of global justice.  We 
defend the view that countries owe payments to a global fund for the value of 
unimproved natural resources that they have appropriated, and that this fund is to 
be divided on some egalitarian basis among the citizens of the world.  We 
disagree, however, on whether the global fund is to be divided equally among all 
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(so that no net rent is paid if one appropriates only a per capita share) or to be 
divided so as to promote effective equality of opportunity for a good life.  We 
discuss and debate these issues. 
1. Introduction 
 
We address the question of what obligations of economic justice citizens of one country have to 
citizens of other countries.  We hold that there are some such obligations, and although we hold 
that these obligations are obligations of individual citizens, we speak loosely of obligations of 
one country to another—understood as the composite obligations of the citizens of one country 
to citizens of another. 
 We are concerned here with duties of justice, which we understand as enforceable duties 
of morality.  They are the moral duties that agents have that other agents are morally permitted to 
coerce them to fulfill.  On most views, not all moral duties are duties of justice, since there are 
some duties (such as helping one’s elderly mother, perhaps) that are not legitimately enforceable 
by others.  We believe that there are duties of justice between (citizens of different) countries.
 We address the issue of global economic justice by addressing the question of who owns 
what in the world.  There are three categories of things that must be considered: beings with 
moral standing (beings that matter morally for their own sake), natural resources (unproduced 
resources with no standing, such as land, air, water, etc.), and artifacts (produced resources with 
no standing).  For simplicity, we assume that all beings with moral standing are agents (rational 
choosers), and we thus ignore the important and difficult problem of the status of children, 
fetuses, and animals (which we believe have some sort of non-full moral standing).  We also 
assume that there is just one generation of agents, and we thus also ignore the important 
problems concerning future generations.  These gross simplifications permit us to focus on the 
core issues of global economic justice that arise in a context of a single generation of agents. 
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2. A Brief Statement of the Problem 
What does economic justice require in the way of wealth distribution among countries? We focus 
on two kinds of wealth (1) human wealth, which are the personal characteristics of the citizens 
that are conducive to a good life (e.g., what capacities they have); (2) non-agent resource wealth, 
which are the non-agent resources of the country that are conducive to a good life (e.g., land, 
machines, etc.).  Furthermore for each of these two types of wealth, we can distinguish between: 
(a) the initial wealth (i.e., the initial personal characteristics of the citizens, and the initial natural 
resources), (b) the created part of the wealth (e.g., the personal characteristics that the citizens 
choose to develop and the artifacts that they choose to produce).  Making the distinction between 
the initial and the created parts is of course almost always difficult in practice, and even in theory 
there are many murky issues.  We believe, however, that sense can be made of this distinction, 
and simply assume it here. 
 We both agree that inequalities in wealth that are appropriately attributable to the choices 
of the agents involved (e.g., the extent to which they develop their capacities or produce 
artifacts) are not issues of justice.  (Recall that we are here assuming a single generation of 
agents.  Where there are multiple generations, this view may need to be modified.) Although this 
is a controversial issue, we simply assume it in what follows.  Hence in what follows we are only 
concerned with inequalities in unchosen (initial) personal characteristics and natural resources. 
 Our question then is: To what extent do agents of one country owe agents of another 
country payments if their unchosen (initial) natural resources or personal characteristics are more 
valuable? 
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3. Left-Libertarianism: A First Gloss 
We defend a left-libertarian theory of justice, and discuss its implications for global justice.  In 
our simplified world there are agents, natural resources, and artifacts.  Libertarian theories of 
justice hold that agents, at least initially, own themselves, and thus owe no service to others, 
except through voluntary action.  The most familiar libertarian theories (e.g., Nozick [1974]) are 
right-libertarian in that they hold that natural resources are initially unowned and, under a broad 
range of realistic circumstances, can be privately appropriated without the consent of, or any 
significant payment to, the other members of society.  Left-libertarian theories, by contrast, hold 
that natural resources are owned by the members of society in some egalitarian manner, and may 
be appropriated only in ways that are compatible with the rights of all to natural resources.  Left-
libertarian theories have been propounded for over two centuries1, but in recent years there has 
been a revival of interest in them.  Theories roughly of this sort (but with some important 
qualifications noted below) have been explored (but not defended) by Gibbard [1976] and Kolm 
[1985, 1986], advocated by Grunebaum [1987], Steiner [1994], Van Parijs [1995], and Tideman 
[1991, 1994, 1997, 1998], and criticized by Cohen [1995]. 
 Left-libertarianism has two central ideas: (1) Agents own themselves.  (2) The value of 
natural resources is owned in some egalitarian sense.  Different left-libertarian theories have 
different conceptions either of self-ownership or of the relevant form of egalitarian ownership of 
natural resources (and indirectly of the ownership of artifacts).  We start by explaining and 
motivating the thesis of self-ownership for agents.  Then we discuss some different conceptions 
of egalitarian ownership of natural resources. 
The core idea of self-ownership is that agents own themselves in much the same way that 
they can own inanimate objects.  This ownership is typically taken to include, at a minimum, (1) 
full control rights over (power to grant and deny permission for) the use of their persons (e.g., 
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what things are done to them) and (2) full immunity from payment for the possession and 
exercise of these rights (ensuring, for example, that the rights are not merely rented).  One of us 
(Vallentyne) holds that self-ownership also includes (3) full rights to transfer the rights they 
have to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), so that individuals are able to make binding and 
enforceable commitments of personal services and even to sell themselves into slavery.  The 
other of us (Tideman) denies (3), and holds the control and payment immunity rights of (1) and 
(2) are inalienable and cannot be transferred to others. Although he denies that individuals have 
the power to make binding and enforceable commitments of personal services, his view does 
permit a person to pledge his/her accumulated physical wealth as security for a personal service 
commitment. (On this view one can agree to forfeit some of one’s wealth if one does not perform 
a specified personal service, but one cannot transfer the moral right to decide whether one will 
perform the service.) Vallentyne’s view gives an agent who does not change his/her mind a more 
valuable ownership of him/herself, while Tideman’s view ensures that any person that one 
encounters owns him/herself to the greatest extent that a person can.2 
Self-ownership, on either view, is plausible because it imposes appropriate constraints on 
how individuals may be treated by others without their consent.  Killing, torturing, or enslaving 
innocent individuals without their consent is unjust no matter how effective it may be as a means 
to some moral goal.  Some form of self-ownership is necessary to recognize adequately that 
agents have the formal right to control the use of their person.  There are some things (such as 
physical contact of various sorts) that others may not do to an agent without his/her consent, and 
those very things are permissible if the agent gives his/her consent and the owners of other 
resources involved give their consent.  The view that agents have the right to control the use of 
their persons is, of course, highly controversial.  A constraint against killing an agent need not be 
accompanied by the right of the agent to waive the constraint, as self-ownership holds.  (One 
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might hold, for example, that killing is always wrong—even with the consent of the agent.) A 
full argument would need to address many important relevant issues that we here ignore. 
 The assumption that some form of self-ownership imposes constraints on the promotion 
of equality need not be the assumption that self-ownership as we define it imposes such 
constraints.  Our concept of self-ownership gives agents both control rights over the use of their 
persons and various tax immunities.  One can endorse a partial form of self-ownership (e.g., 
control rights) without endorsing full self-ownership (e.g. with full tax immunities).  So, much 
more argument is needed for a full defense of self-ownership.  We hope that we have said 
enough to give it at least some plausibility. 
 Self-ownership is one central ideal of left-libertarianism.  The other is egalitarian 
ownership of the value of natural resources.  There are many forms that this egalitarian 
ownership can take, and we defend one form. 
 One basic issue concerns the level of jurisdiction at which egalitarian ownership applies.  
One view is that the land occupied by each country is owned in some egalitarian manner by its 
citizens, but that non-citizens have no claim to the value of that land.  This would be egalitarian 
internally, but viewed globally, this might involve an extremely inegalitarian distribution of 
rights over natural resources.  Those who live in countries that control less valuable natural 
resources would thereby have less valuable ownership rights.  Natural resources were not created 
by any (non-divine) agent, and no agent has any special entitlement to a greater share merely 
because he/she happened to be there first.  Hence, any plausible view treats the egalitarian 
ownership of natural resources as holding at the global level (the entire world).  This crucial 
claim is assumed in what follows. 
 According to one version of left-libertarianism, natural resources are jointly owned in the 
sense that authorization to use, or to appropriate, is given through some specified collective 
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decision-making process (e.g., by majority or unanimous decision).  One form of this 
approach—advocated (seemingly, at least) by Grunebaum [1987]—holds that collective approval 
is needed for any use, as well as appropriation, of natural resources.  But as Fressola [1981] and 
Cohen [1986, 1995] have argued, this is implausible, since it holds that, for agents like us, no one 
has the right to do anything (e.g., stand in a given spot, eat an apple, or even breathe) without 
authorization from other members of society.  For every action requires the use of some natural 
resources (e.g., occupying a spatial location), and thus no one is permitted to do anything without 
approval from others. 
A more plausible form of joint ownership of natural resources—held perhaps by Grotius 
[1625] and Pufendorf [1672], and explored by Gibbard [1976]—holds that prior to any 
agreement agents are permitted to use natural resources in conformance with specified terms of 
common use, but they have no exclusive rights of use (no private ownership).  Roughly, this 
means that they are permitted to use natural resources in various ways (occupy locations, breathe 
air, eat apples) as long as those resources are not then in use by others (and perhaps subject to 
certain conditions of sustainability), but they have no rights over any natural resources that they 
are not currently using.  On this view, the initial rights over natural resources are like rights over 
public park benches.  One has a right to use a resource (e.g., sit in one), but once one stops using 
it, one has no right to prevent others from using it. 
 Even this form of joint ownership of natural resources, however, is implausible.  For it 
has the implication that no appropriation (i.e. acquisition of exclusive rights of use) could be just 
in the absence of actual collective agreement.  It is most implausible to hold that the consent of 
others is required for just appropriation when communication with all relevant others is 
impossible, extremely difficult, or expensive (as it almost always is).  And even when 
communication is relatively easy and costless, it is unclear why one needs the consent of others 
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as long as one makes an appropriate compensatory payment for the natural resources 
appropriated. 
A different sort of approach holds that agents may use, or appropriate, unappropriated 
natural resources without the permission of others, but if they do so, they acquire certain 
obligations.  Below we suggest that some form of this approach is plausible.  But first we must 
see that some forms clearly are not.  An extreme form of this approach holds that anyone who 
uses natural resources (which is of course everyone) forfeits all rights of self-ownership (e.g., 
acquires an enforceable duty to do whatever maximally promotes equality).  A slightly less 
extreme form allows agents to use natural resources subject to the rules of common use without 
any loss of self-ownership, but holds that anyone who appropriates (claims rights of exclusive 
use over) natural resources forfeits all rights of self-ownership.  Both these views hold that 
agents are “initially” self-owners, and are thus “formally” versions of libertarianism.  Neither is 
plausible because they allow self-ownership to be lost too easily. 
A plausible conception of the ownership of natural resources must be compatible with 
reasonably secure (not easily lost) self-ownership.  At a minimum it should allow unappropriated 
resources to be used by agents without the permission of others and without any loss of the rights 
of self-ownership—as long as it does not violate the property rights of others.  Without some 
such condition of permissible use of natural resources, self-ownership has no real force, since it 
could be lost through the unavoidable use of natural resources.  In addition, a plausible 
conception of the ownership of natural resources should be unilateralist in the sense of allowing 
agents to appropriate unappropriated natural resources without the consent of others—and with 
no loss of self-ownership—as long as they make an appropriate payment (to be discussed 
below).3 
In what follows, then, we consider some unilateralist conceptions of natural resource 
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ownership (in conjunction with self-ownership).  Radical right libertarians—such as Rothbard 
[1978, 1982] and Kirzner [1978]—hold that that there are no payment requirements for the 
appropriation of unappropriated resources.  Agents are free to take ownership of whatever 
unappropriated natural resources they find (or mix their labor with).  Obviously, this is a non-
starter from a viewpoint that requires egalitarian ownership of resources.  Nozickian right 
libertarians—such as Nozick [1974]—hold that the only payment requirements are those of a 
Nozickian proviso, which requires roughly that (taking account of the general benefits of a 
system of exclusive rights to natural resources), no individual be made worse off (in some 
appropriate sense) by the appropriation (compared with the situation before appropriation).4  It 
seems quite plausible that satisfaction of some form of a Nozickian proviso is a necessary 
condition for just unilateral appropriation.  But Nozickian libertarians are mistaken in holding 
that it is sufficient for just appropriation.  For a world without the possibility of appropriating 
exclusive rights to natural resources would leave people very poor.  Little if any compensation is 
required by a Nozickian proviso.  There is no excuse for those who first appropriate natural 
resources to insist that the whole gain in efficiency from institutions for exclusive appropriation 
of natural resources must be assigned to them, when there are alternative protocols for assigning 
the gain that would preserve most if not all of the efficiency gain.  Those who wish to impose an 
institution and justify it on grounds of efficiency have, at most, a claim to the gain as compared 
to the next most efficient institution, not a claim to the gain as compared to no institution. 
Georgist libertarians—such as eponymous George [1879, 1892], Steiner [1977, 1980, 
1981, 1992, 1994], and Tideman [1991, 1994, 1997, 1998]—hold that agents may appropriate 
unappropriated natural resources as long as they pay the competitive value of the rights they 
claim.5  Because of potential problems with future generations (which we are here ignoring), the 
rights involved are usually understood as temporary in nature, and thus the competitive value is 
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understood as the competitive rent owed for the rights claimed.  For simplicity, we also make 
this assumption. 
  We believe that Georgist libertarianism is plausible.  It allows agents to use and 
appropriate unowned natural resources as long as they pay the competitive value of the rights 
they claim.  Furthermore, it holds that agents fully own the artifacts that they produce with their 
labor, as long as they pay the rent on the underlying natural resources they own and the owners 
of any other labor, natural resources, or artifacts involved in the production have consented (e.g., 
in return for a payment) to the use of these resources and have renounced any claim to the 
product.  Thus, for example, if I produce some apples on some land that I have claimed, then I 
own the apples as long as I have paid any required rent for the land.  If I hire someone to work 
for me, and rent some machinery from someone, then I own the apples as long as I have paid any 
required rent for the land, the wages to the hired hand, and the rent for the machinery.   
We address below the question of how the rent payments are to be divided up.  One of us 
suggests that they should be divided up equally, and one of us argues that they should be used to 
promote equality of effective opportunities for a good life (and thus divided up unequally).  The 
point to note here is that, however they are divided up, the duty to make payments is limited to 
the competitive value of the rights over natural resources that one claims.  There are no duties to 
contribute simply because someone is in need.  Nor does the amount that agents are required to 
contribute depend on how fortunate they are with respect to their personal endowments 
(capacities, etc.) or their situational endowments (wealth, opportunities, etc.).  The duty to make 
payments to others is based solely on the value of the natural resources one appropriates.  If one 
appropriates none, one owes nothing. 
Purist egalitarians reject this limited egalitarian duty.  They hold that equality must be 
promoted whenever possible.  No constraints are imposed in principle on how this may be done.  
11 
We believe, however, that the egalitarian duty is indeed limited in two ways.  First, violations of 
self-ownership are not permitted no matter how effective they may be in promoting equality.  
Agents may not be killed, tortured, or assaulted without their consent.  Nor may they be coerced 
into providing involuntary services for others (e.g., mandatory labor for the state).  Nor do agents 
owe any taxes merely because they exist or because they use natural resources in ways that do 
not reduce the value of the opportunities of others.  Second, although agents do owe taxes (rent) 
if they appropriate natural resources, these taxes are based solely on the competitive value of the 
rights over the resources that they claim.  No taxes are owed for simply having or exercising 
one’s talents.  For example, setting taxes for each agent at some fraction of the value of his/her 
actual or maximally valuable annual product is inadmissible. 
 So, the Georgist conception of egalitarian ownership of natural resources is plausible 
because it recognizes that agents must pay the full competitive value of any rights of over natural 
resources they claim, but it denies that agents have an unlimited duty to promote equality. 
 If Georgist left-libertarianism is accepted, then we can draw one implication for global 
justice.  Each country is required by justice to make a payment for distribution among all 
countries equal to the value of the rights they have claimed over unimproved natural resources.  
Countries that have appropriated more valuable natural resources owe more than those who have 
appropriated less valuable natural resources. 
 So far, so good.  We now consider how these rent payments are to be allocated among 
countries. 
 
4. Distributing the Rent Payments 
So far we have addressed the obligations to make payments for natural resources appropriated.  
We now turn to how these payments are to be distributed.  For simplicity we ignore the 
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important question of how administrative expenses are factored in and simply discuss how the 
payments should be distributed if it could be done without any administrative cost. 
 There is, of course, a very wide range of possible answers to the question of how the rent 
payments should be distributed.  One might hold, for example, that a utilitarian principle should 
be applied.  We simply assume here that some sort of egalitarian principle should be applied.  
After all, natural resources are in some sense the common property of all. 
 One of us (Tideman) holds that the rent payments should be divided equally among all 
agents in the world.  The net effect of this idea, in conjunction with the idea that competitive rent 
is owed for rights claimed over natural resources, is that agents and countries effectively owe 
rent payments only to the extent that they appropriate more than an equal per capita share of the 
value of natural resources.  For if they appropriate just a per capita share, their share of the rent 
payments equals the rent they owe, and hence no net rent is due. 
 The other of us (Vallentyne) holds that the rent payments should be divided so as to 
promote effective equality of opportunity for a good life.  There are, of course, many issues here 
that a full theory of equality promotion would have to address.  What makes for a good life? 
How exactly are effective opportunities understood? On what basis are effective opportunities 
assessed? Are the requisite interpersonal comparisons possible? How is equality measured? 
These important issues are not addressed here, except to stipulate that the relevant equality 
promotion is to be done by making people’s lives better, and not by leveling-down.6 For present 
purposes it suffices to contrast this view with the previous one.  On Vallentyne’s view, the rent 
payments are not normally divided up equally but rather divided up unequally so as to equalize 
effective opportunities for a good life (whatever exactly that requires).  Someone who has 
advantageous unchosen personal capacities (e.g., a strong, beautiful, intelligent person with a 
happy disposition) gets less (and perhaps nothing) from the rent payments than a person with 
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disadvantageous personal capacities (e.g., a weak, ugly, stupid person with a depressive 
disposition).  (If our model had more than one generation, we might ask whether those who bring 
weak, ugly, stupid people with depressive dispositions into the world have an obligation to 
compensate those who thereby receive less rent.) The same point applies to those who have 
advantageous unchosen situations (e.g., those who come to start life in an especially desirable 
physical or social location).  The most basic point on this view is simply that the division of the 
rent payments should compensate for unchosen inequalities in opportunities for a good life. 
 Because we both agree that the demands of equality are limited to how the rent payments 
should be spent, we both agree that agents and countries do not have a duty of justice to do 
whatever is necessary to promote equality.  The economic duties of agents and countries are 
determined by the value of the natural resources that they appropriate, and do not depend on the 
needs or relative deprivations of others (except of course to the extent that this affects the 
competitive value of the rights claimed). 
 At issue is how the independently generated rent payments are to be divided.  Tideman 
endorses the view that each agent has a right to an equal share of the value of natural resources.  
Vallentyne endorses the view that justice requires that the value of natural resources be used to 
promote effectively equality of opportunity for a good life.  At issue between the two views is 
the question of whether disadvantages in unchosen characteristics entitles one to a greater share 
of the value of natural resources (the rent payments).  This is a deep and controversial issue that 
we cannot develop here.  Suffice it to say that the equal share view is a form of external 
resourcism—the view that justice is concerned only with the distribution of external (non-
personal resources), and that the effectively equality of opportunity view is a form of 
welfarism—the view that justice is concerned with the distribution of all resources (personal and 
external) and with how they affect the opportunity for a good life. 
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 In terms of global justice, this issue is relevant only if there are differences among 
countries in the average value of the effective opportunities for a good life.  One way that there 
can be such differences is by there being differences in the distribution of innate personal 
capacities of the citizens (initial immunity to disease and depression, disposition to intelligence, 
strength, etc.).  In the world as it is, for reasonably large countries the differences on average in 
such characteristics are likely to be quite small.  Furthermore, even where there are significant 
differences, our knowledge of the differences is likely to be very limited.  Hence, in practice in 
typical cases it is unlikely that there will be a difference between the two approaches with respect 
to the impact of differences of innate personal capacities.  As we now indicate however, there are 
other sources where the two approaches to the division of the rent payments are likely to yield 
significant differences in practice. 
 First, even if countries differ little on average in the distribution of innate personal 
capacities, the (e.g. socially inherited) initial (unchosen) beliefs, values, and practical knowledge 
of adults may have a significant impact on their effective opportunity for a good life.  If 
individuals in one country start adult life with many more false beliefs (e.g., false superstitions 
about how to avoid disease and depression, about how to develop intelligence and strength, etc.), 
that reduces the value of their effective opportunity for a good life.  Likewise, if the individuals 
start life with values that are very difficult to satisfy, and very difficult to change, this too may 
have a significant impact on the value of their effective opportunities for a good life.  To the 
extent these factors have such an effect, the equality promotion model of the division of the rent 
payments, but not the equal division model, gives countries with a greater proportion of such 
disadvantaged individuals a greater share of the rent payments. 
 So far we have considered ways in which individuals might be disadvantaged in their 
effective opportunity for a good life by their own personal characteristics.  Individuals can also 
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be disadvantaged by the personal characteristics of their neighbors, and by the general social 
climate in their country and in neighboring countries.  The extent to which others in one’s 
country are disposed to trust and cooperate with others (whether this is innate or socially 
conditioned), for example, very much affects one’s effective life opportunities. The two models 
of division of the rent payments are likely to differ because of such differences.7 
 Yet another factor in the determination of effective opportunities for a good life is the 
vicinity to desirable natural resources.  Although those who appropriate natural resources owe 
competitive rent for the rights claimed, the starting geographical positions of agents affect their 
effective opportunities for a good life.  First, citizens may have unchosen psychological 
attachments to their geographical region of origin, even if it is otherwise less desirable.  More 
generally, the costs of moving to take advantage of desirable natural resources depends very 
much on where one starts from.  So this is yet another factor that affects the effective 
opportunities for a good life. 
 Finally, the artifacts (roads, machines, etc.) with which the citizens of a country start their 
adult life are another source of inequality in effective opportunity for a good life.  Strictly 
speaking, in our simplified model in which there is only one generation of agents, there are no 
such artifacts, but it is worth mentioning here because in real life they are likely to be a major 
source of inequality of effective opportunity for a good life.  We have not here addressed the 
status of such artifacts, but for the record one of us (Tideman) holds that those who own artifacts 
have a right to transfer them to others by gift without any taxation, and one of us (Vallentyne) 
denies that individuals have such a right.  The point here is simply to note that to the extent that 
there is transmission of artifactual wealth from one generation to a later generation, this too is a 
factor in generating inequality of effective opportunity for a good life among countries. 
 In sum, there are likely to be significant differences in practice between the two models 
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of rent payment division.  It ultimately boils down to whether one views the value of natural 
resources as a fund to be divided equally or as a fund for the promotion of effective equality of 
opportunity for a good life. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have given the outline of a left-libertarian theory of justice according to which each agent, 
initially at least, owns him/herself, and natural resources are owned in some egalitarian sense.  
Self-ownership, we have suggested, is needed to provide agents with adequate protection against 
interference from others.  Egalitarian ownership of natural resources is plausible because none of 
the agents created these resources.  Furthermore, this egalitarian ownership is most plausible 
when understood as global (and not merely national) egalitarian ownership of the value of 
natural resources.  We have defended a version of Georgist left-libertarianism according to 
which those who appropriate natural resources are required to pay competitive rent for the value 
of the rights they claim.  This generates a fund of rent payments that is to be divided among the 
citizens of the world. 
 There are many important unresolved issues in this approach.  In particular, we, the 
authors, disagree about how the rent payments are to be divided.  Tideman holds that the rent 
payments should be divided equally among all agents, whereas Vallentyne holds that the rent 
payments should be spent so as to promote effectively equality of opportunity for a good life 
among agents.  In addition to these, there are many other important issues that need to be 
addressed.  We identify some of the main ones in the appendix. 
 On any plausible view of left-libertarianism, however, national boundaries are arbitrary 
in principle (although not in practice), and those countries that have appropriated more than their 
per capita share of the value of natural resources, and for which the average unchosen advantage 
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is greater than the global average, owe payments to those countries that that have appropriated 
less than their per capita share of the value of natural resources, and for which the average 
unchosen advantage is no greater than the global average. 
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Appendix: Important issues that a full left-libertarian theory would need to address 
 
1.  The notion of competitive rent: Exactly how is competitive rent determined? What are the 
initial allocations of rights relative to which demand and supply operate (e.g., common use of 
natural resources as modified by past just appropriations)? What is the relevant process for 
determining the competitive value (market-clearing price? second price auction?)? Do problems 
of multiple equilibria (multiple possible competitive prices) arise, and if so, how are they 
handled? 
2.  Dealing with existing beings with partial moral standing (i.e., that are not full agents): How is 
the theory extended to deal with sentient beings with no potential for agency (low level animals, 
defective humans), sentient beings with no agency but with the potential for agency (normal 
fetuses, infants), sentient beings with partial agency (children, great apes)? 
3.  Dealing with future beings with moral standing: How are the following issues to be dealt with 
in light of the definite or possible existence of future beings with moral standing: the use non-
renewable resources, gifts to later generations, procreation? 
4.  Implementation: To whom is rent to be paid where there is no government or no government 
that distributes the rent appropriately (e.g., if the government is grossly inefficient or corrupt)? 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1
 Early exponents of some form of self-ownership combined with some form of egalitarian 
ownership of natural resources include: Ogilvie [1781], Spence [1793], Paine [1795], Colins 
[1835], Huet [1853], Dove [1850, 1854], Spencer [1851], George [1879, 1892], and Walras 
[1896].  For insightful discussion of some of these early views, see Cunliffe [1987, 1988, 1990a, 
1990b, 1998]. 
2
 Another way of capturing the difference in views is to say that both hold that agents fully own 
themselves, but Vallentyne regards the agents who own themselves as people in the normal 
intuitive sense (e.g., that can live for fifty years or more), while Tideman holds that the agents 
that own themselves are “agent-stages” which exist only for very short periods of time. 
3
 We leave open here what agents must do in addition to making an appropriate payment.  The 
most plausible view, we believe, simply requires that they stake a claim (assert certain rights).  
The payment owed would thus depend on what rights are claimed.  Other possible views are that 
agents must discover the natural resource, or that they must mix their labor with it.  Although we 
believe neither of these view to be plausible, for generality we leave open this issue. 
4
 Locke [1690] was not a Nozickian libertarian.  For he disallowed appropriation that would lead 
to spoilage, he rejected the right of voluntary self-enslavement, and he held that one had a duty 
to provide the means of subsistence to those unable to provide for themselves.  He arguably also 
rejected the Nozickian proviso, since he may have meant “enough and as good” to mean “an 
equally valuable share”. 
5
 For discussion of the views of Henry George, and of contemporary Georgist economists, see: 
Andelson [1991], Harrison, Hudson, Miller and Feder [1994], Tideman [1994], and Wenzer 
[1997].  Van Parijs [1995] also defends charging competitive rent for the appropriation of natural 
resources.  He is not, however, a Georgist libertarian because he endorses charging rent on (or 
taxes equal to up to 100% of the value of) all non-personal assets that were “given” to an agent 
(as opposed to produced by him/her). 
6
 Vallentyne would defend the view that equality should be promoted among the Pareto optimal 
arrangements (i.e., arrangements for which no one’s opportunity set can be improved except by 
making someone else’s opportunity set worse). 
7
 Another factor that can affect life opportunities is the material wealth inherited from previous 
generations of one’s country. Given, however, that we are assuming only a single generation, this 
factor won’t arise. 
